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Abstract 
 
The goal of this paper is to empirically examine the relation between management compensation and 
project life.  Prior theoretical research suggests that short-term compensation, in the form of bonus 
plans, have a tendency to induce managers to invest in projects with short lives. Initially, we develop a 
model that relates management compensation, earnings announcement and project life defined in 
terms of duration.  Our testable hypothesis states that a greater weight placed on short-term 
compensation induces managers to invest in projects with shorter duration and is reflected in a lower 
earnings response coefficient (ERC) for a concurrent earnings announcement. We empirically 
examine whether there is a relation between type of managerial compensation and ERC. After 
controlling for the firm's investment opportunity set and other variables known to affect the ERC, we 
find strong evidence indicating a negative relation between project life and the fraction of short-term 
compensation in the total compensation package.  This result provides evidence that managers with 
greater proportionate earnings-based compensation tend to invest in shorter-term projects. 
 
 
1.  Hypothesis 
 
 Researchers in the past suggest that short-term compensation may induce managers to accept shorter-term 
projects thereby resulting in corporate myopia (Hayes & Abernathy (1980), Woolridge (1993), and Narayanan 
(1985).  This paper provides an empirical test to determine if a higher proportionate short-term compensation 
induces managers to invest in shorter-term projects.  We conduct this test using the earnings response coefficient as 
a proxy for project duration.  A derivation and proof that ERC is a proxy for project life is available from the 
authors.  See Table 1 for a summary of ERC research. 
 
 We postulate that ceteris paribus, higher proportionate short-term compensation is associated with a lower 
ERC on the earnings announcement date.   
 
 
Table 1: 
Prior Research on the ERC and persistence of earnings innovations. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Miller & Rock (1985) – Present model showing that the market reaction to earnings announcements (ERC) is a 
function of the persistence of earnings innovations. 
 
 Kormendi & Lipe (1987) – Empirical test of Miller & Rock.  They show that ERC is positively correlated with 
persistence, using an ARIMA model to proxy persistence. 
 
 Easton & Zmijewski (1989) – Empirical test of ERC.  They show that ERC is a function of persistence (ARIMA), risk 
(Beta), and investment opportunity set (market value to book value of equity). 
 
 Harikumar & Harter (1995) – Empirical test to show that Tobin’s Q is a proxy for the investment opportunity set. 
 
 Subramanyam & Wild (1996) – Empirical test of relation between ERC and firm life.  Show statistically significant 
inverse relation between firm’s probability of termination and ERC. 
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2.  Empirical Model 
 
 We test our hypothesis using a sample obtained from the 1987 Forbes 800 firms with compensation data on 
salary, bonus, stock rights, stock ownership and compensation from exercise of options.
1
  Each firm included in our 
sample was required to have all the relevant data on the COMPUSAT, CRSP, and IBES tapes.  Our final sample 
consists of 251 firms.  In order to mitigate the measurement problems associated with the estimation of unexpected 
earnings, we employ reverse regressions and examine the `Return Response Coefficient' (RRC) instead of ERC.
2
  
This approach reduces measurement error by placing the noisiest variable on the left-hand side of the regression 
equation.   
 
 We investigate the impact of short-term compensation on RRC after controlling for persistence and size of 
the firm.  As presented in Table 1, Collins and Kothari (1989) show that firms with higher market to book value of 
equity ratios (firms with growth opportunities) tend to have greater persistence in earnings, thereby resulting in a 
higher ERC.  Harikumar and Harter (1995) use the Miller and Rock (1985) model and show that Tobin's q serves as 
a proxy for persistence and significantly affects the ERC. They also show that the correlation between Tobin's q and 
the ratio market to book value of equity is about 0.80 and therefore the ratio market to book value of equity serves as 
a proxy for persistence.  Hence, we include the ratio of market to book value of equity as an independent variable in 
our test.  If size is a proxy for differences in informationalenvironment, then different sized firms will exhibit 
different ERC's [Collins, Kothari and Rayburn (1987)].  In order to control for such differences in the informational 
environment, we use the natural logarithm of assets as an independent variable controlling for the size of the firm.   
 
 We go one step further comparing the relation between ERC and management compensation for a sample 
of firms with primarily short-term compensation to a sample of firms with primarily long-term compensation.  The 
results are presented below. 
 
3. Results 
 
 Table 2 presents the summary characteristics of our sample.  The median short-term compensation as a 
fraction of total compensation is 57.79%.  Thus, our sample is not materially biased toward either short-term or 
long-term (stock-based) compensation.  The median value of market to book value of equity is 2.1534.  A high 
median value suggests that the sample of firms in our study have profitable growth opportunities that may affect the 
ERC.  The correlation matrix in Panel B reveals some interesting results.  The percent of compensation in terms of 
salary and bonus (EC) is significantly negatively correlated with market to book value of equity (MB) indicating that 
managers of firms with greater investment opportunities tend to be compensated with proportionately more stock-
based compensation.
3
 There is also significant positive correlation between EC and SIZE and a significant negative 
correlation between MB and SIZE.  
 
Earnings-based compensation and project life 
 
 Our hypothesis states that, ceteris paribus, there is a negative relation between the proportion of short-term 
compensation and project life.  Earnings innovations arising from investments with shorter lives, by definition, do 
not persist.   This suggests that the RRC for firms with managers compensated with proportionately more earnings-
based compensation will be higher than the RRC for firms with managers compensated with proportionately more 
stock-based compensation. 
 
 
                     
1 These are firms that appear in any of the four lists, made by Forbes magazine in 1987, as measured by sales, total assets, market value of equity or 
profits.  [See Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) for a recent use of this data source.]  
2 See Collins and Kothari (1989), Maddala (1977) and Beaver, Lambert, and Ryan (1987) for a discussion on reverse regressions and return response 
coefficients. 
3 See Lewellen, Loderer, and Martin (1987) for a discussion on the relation between growth opportunities and earnings/stock-based compensation. 
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Table 2: 
This table provides the overall characteristics of our sample. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
 
Variable   N   Mean   Median  Standard Deviation 
 
UES   251   0.0023   0.0000   0.0473 
XRET   251   0.0041   0.0023   0.0348 
EC   251   0.5442   0.5779   0.2763 
MB   251   2.1534   1.7711   2.1534 
SIZE   251   7.9402   7.8346   1.0715 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 
  EC  MB  SIZE 
EC  1.0000 
MB  -0.3675*** 1.0000   
SIZE  0.1453**  -0.2776*** 1.0000 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes 
UES = Standardized unexpected earnings 
XRET = Excess returns around the earnings announcement date 
EC = Proportion of short-term compensation (in terms of salary and bonus) to total compensation  
MB = Market to book value of equity 
SIZE = Log (Assets) 
*   Significant at 10%. 
**   Significant at 5%. 
***   Significant at 1%. 
 
 
 Table 3 presents the results from our Model.  The adjusted R
2
 is 0.1015.  The F-statistic for the regression 
is significant at 1 percent.  The coefficient on EC is 1.1809 and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  This 
result supports our hypothesis that higher proportion of the earnings-based compensation is associated with a higher 
RRC or a lower ERC.  As ERC is a proxy for project life, we find that short-term compensation results in managers 
taking shorter-term projects.  We also find a negative relation between market to book value of equity and RRC.  
While this is consistent with the results reported in the literature [Harikumar and Harter (1995)], the coefficient is 
statistically significant only at the 10% level. We do not find a statistically significant result for the SIZE variable. 
 
 The results of our test comparing firms with long-term compensation to firms with short-term 
compensation is presented in Table 4.  The adjusted R
2
 is higher at 0.1041.   
 
The F-statistic for the regression is significant at the 1% level.  The coefficient on the dummy interaction 
variable is highly significant at the 1% level.  This indicates that the RRC for the set of firms with higher than 
median values of EC is significantly greater than that for firms with lower than median values of EC.  Since there is 
an inverse relation between RRC and ERC, we find that firms with higher than median values of EC are associated 
with a lower ERC.  As ERC is a proxy for project life, we conclude that the evidence in Table 4 strongly supports 
our hypothesis that short-term compensation induces managers to take on shorter term projects.  The other variables 
in the regression are not statistically significant, although the signs of the coefficients are as hypothesized.   
 
 Firms with profitable investment opportunities have high Tobin’s q-ratios, and firms with unprofitable 
investment opportunities have low q ratios.  We compute q as market value of equity plus book value of debt 
divided by the book value of assets.  This renders the q ratio as a more accurate measure of the `quality' of the firm's 
current and future investment opportunities.  Lang and Litzenberger (1989) demonstrate that an average q ratio 
greater than unity is a necessary condition for a firm to be at the value-maximizing  level of investment.  In 
thiscontext, we examined the relation between ERC and short-term compensation for two sub-samples, one 
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consisting of firms with q ratio less than the median of 1.78 and the other consisting of firms with q ratio greater 
than 1.78.  We hypothesize that the low q sub-sample ought to reveal a stronger (positive) negative relation between 
RRC (ERC ) and proportionate short-term compensation.
4
 
 
 
Table 3: 
This regression introduces the variables for earnings based compensation, market to 
book value of equity and the size of the firm.  Values in parenthesis denote t-statistics.  
 
Model : UESi=b0 + b1XRETi + b2 (ECi*XRETi) + b3 (MBi*XRETi) + b4 (SIZEi*XRETi) + ei 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Variable       Results   
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept       0.0012 
       (0.4180) 
XRET       0.6185 
       (0.8470) 
EC*XRET      1.1809 
       (3.7040)*** 
MB*XRET      -0.1044 
       (-1.6680)* 
SIZE*XRET      -0.0904 
       (-0.9370) 
F       8.061*** 
R2       0.1159 
Adj. R2       0.1015 
N       251 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Notes 
UES = Standardized unexpected earnings 
XRET = Excess returns around the earnings announcement date 
EC = Proportion of short-term compensation (in terms of salary and bonus) 
to total compensation  
MB = Market to book value of equity 
SIZE = Log (Assets) 
*       Significant at 10%, 
**     Significant at 5%,  
***   Significant at 1%. 
 
 
 The results are presented in Table 5.   Panel A contains results for the low q sub-sample.  The benchmark 
model reveals a significant announcement effect.  Model 1 indicates that there is a statistically significant positive 
relation (at the 1% level) between RRC and proportionate short-term compensation.  This also implies that there is a 
significant negative relation between ERC and proportionate short-term compensation.  This is consistent with our 
hypothesis.   The results for model 2 in the case of the high q sub-sample are presented in Table 5, Panel B.  We find 
that there is no statistically significant relation between ERC and proportionate short-term compensation.
5
  This 
result suggests that there is a stronger relation between short-term compensation and tendency to select projects with 
shorter lives among firms with a low q. This result, however, must be read with caution as the benchmark model in 
Panel B does not reveal a significant announcement effect.  The results from Model 3 are qualitatively similar. 
 
 
 
 
                     
4 We also conduct a similar test using the MB ratio to stratify the sample.  The results were qualitatively the same and hence not reported here. 
5 This result must be read with caution as the benchmark model does not reveal a significant announcement effect for this sub-sample. 
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Table 4: 
This regression introduces the variables for earnings based compensation, market to book 
value of equity and the size of the firm.  The dummy variable on the compensation 
variable takes on a value of 1 if EC > median EC of 0.58, else it is equal to 0. 
Values in parenthesis denote t-statistics. 
 
Model : UESi=b0 + b1XRETi + b2 Dum*(ECi*XRETi) + b3 (MBi*XRETi) + b4 (SIZEi*XRETi) + ei 
  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable        Model 2  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept        0.0014   
        (0.4900)   
XRET        0.5216  
        (0.719)   
Dum*EC*XRET       0.9081 
        (3.8040)*** 
MB*XRET       -0.0812  
        (-1.2660)  
SIZE*XRET       -0.0472  
        (-0.5110)  
F        8.263***  
R2        0.1184  
Adj. R2        0.1041  
N        251  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes 
UES = Standardized unexpected earnings 
XRET = Excess returns around the earnings announcement date 
Dum = Dummy variable (Dum) = 1 if EC > 0.58 (median EC), else Dum = 0. 
EC = Proportion of short-term compensation (in terms of salary and bonus)  
to total compensation  
MB = Market to book value of equity 
SIZE = Log (Assets) 
*       Significant at 10%, 
**     Significant at 5%,  
***   Significant at 1%. 
 
 
6. Implications 
 
 Our results suggest that managers compensated primarily with salary and bonuses focus their attention on 
short term profitability.  Managers receiving stock compensation show more concern for the long-run profitability of 
the firm.  This result suggests that stockholders benefit when firms offer stock options or some other form of stock 
compensation to managers when those managers have an opportunity to decide among projects to invest firm 
resources.   
 
 Recently the press has suggested that some managers receive such a large number of stock options that they 
may be over compensated.  For example, a manager receiving 1 million options earns $1 million dollars if the stock 
price increases one dollar.  This large number of options may impact the incentive affect derived from stock option 
compensation.  In this paper we found an inverse relation between the proportion of short-term to long-term 
compensation and project life.  Our methodology did not consider the actual dollar amounts of compensation.  
Future research is needed to determine if there are diminishing to long-term compensation.   
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Table 5 : 
This table presents the results for all the models in the context of sub-samples stratified on the basis of the full sample median 
Tobin’s q of 1.78.  Values in parenthesis denote t-statistics. 
 
Panel A:  Sample of firms with q < 1.78 
 
Variable   Benchmark   Model 1   Model 2 
 
Intercept    0.0002    0.0026   0.0026 
    (0.0300)    (0.4660)   (0.4580) 
XRET    0.5291    -0.4295   0.1800 
    (3.0820) ***   (-0.2640)   (0.1120) 
EC*XRET   -    2.2128   - 
        (3.2600) *** 
Dum*EC*XRET   -    -   1.3098 
           (2.963) *** 
SIZE*XRET   -    -0.0537   -0.0399 
        (-0.2710)   (-0.2000) 
F    9.500***    6.944***   6.280*** 
R2    0.0717    0.1469   0.1347 
Adj. R2    0.0642    0.1257   0.1133 
N    125    125   125 
 
Panel B:  Sample of firms with q > 1.78 
 
Variable   Benchmark   Model 1   Model 2 
 
Intercept    0.0008    0.0007   0.0007 
    (0.9130)    (0.8170)   (0.8180) 
XRET    0.0239    -0.1357   -0.0910 
    (0.9540)    (-0.6240)   (-0.4300) 
EC*XRET   -    0.0693   - 
        (0.6060)    
Dum*EC*XRET   -       0.1438 
           (1.4780)  
SIZE*XRET   -    0.0190   0.0137 
        (0.5930)   (0.4640) 
F    0.9090    0.7660   1.381 
R2    0.0073    0.0185   0.0328 
Adj. R2    -0.0007    -0.0056   0.0091 
N    126    126   126 
Notes 
UES = Standardized unexpected earnings 
XRET = Excess returns around the earnings announcement date 
Dum = Dummy variable (Dum) = 1 if EC > 0.58 (median EC), else Dum = 0. 
EC = Proportion of total compensation in terms of salary and bonus 
MB = Market to book value of equity 
SIZE = Log (Assets) 
*       Significant at 10%, 
**     Significant at 5%,  
***   Significant at 1%. 
 
 
 The Financial Accounting Standards Board in the United States has struggled with proper accounting for 
executive stock options for over ten years.  Current accounting standards in the US allow flexibility in reporting.  
Firms can expense the fair value of the options or they can avoid most of the expense by using the intrinsic value 
approach.  Our research indicates that executive stock options impact management behavior and therefore benefit 
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the firm.  We did not address the expensing vs. no expensing issue.  However, in our opinion proper matching would 
suggest that the fair value of the options should be expensed in the period that managers adopt projects. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 Prior literature suggests that earnings-based compensation tends to induce managers to invest in shorter-
term projects.  While there are many sources that collect data on CEO compensation, it is not practical to collect 
data on the project characteristics of each investment made by a large set of firms for an empirical study.  Having 
developed a proxy for project life, we study the relation between management compensation and ERC.  We find that 
firms that compensate their managers with greater proportionate short-term (earnings-based) compensation are also 
those with a lower ERC or ones with a relatively short-lived asset mix. This result holds even after controlling for 
market to book value of equity and size of the firm. 
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